Fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences

作者:

摘要

We consider the discrete assignment problem in which agents express ordinal preferences over objects and these objects are allocated to the agents in a fair manner. We use the stochastic dominance relation between fractional or randomized allocations to systematically define varying notions of proportionality and envy-freeness for discrete assignments. The computational complexity of checking whether a fair assignment exists is studied for these fairness notions. We also characterize the conditions under which a fair assignment is guaranteed to exist. For a number of fairness concepts, polynomial-time algorithms are presented to check whether a fair assignment exists. Our algorithmic results also extend to the case of unequal entitlements of agents. Our NP-hardness result, which holds for several variants of envy-freeness, answers an open question posed by Bouveret, Endriss, and Lang (ECAI 2010). We also propose fairness concepts that always suggest a non-empty set of assignments with meaningful fairness properties. Among these concepts, optimal proportionality and optimal weak proportionality appear to be desirable fairness concepts.

论文关键词:Fair division,Resource allocation,Envy-freeness,Proportionality

论文评审过程:Received 28 June 2014, Revised 7 June 2015, Accepted 14 June 2015, Available online 18 June 2015, Version of Record 23 June 2015.

论文官网地址:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2015.06.002