Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: A theoretical analysis
作者：
Highlights：
• Electoral control models ways of changing the outcome of an election via adding, deleting, or partitioning candidates or voters.
• A long-running project of research seeks to classify the major voting systems in terms of their computational resistance.
• We show that fallback voting is resistant to each of the common types of control except two destructive control types.
• We show that Bucklin voting performs almost as well as fallback voting in terms of control resistance.
• We investigate the parameterized control complexity of Bucklin and fallback voting.
摘要
•Electoral control models ways of changing the outcome of an election via adding, deleting, or partitioning candidates or voters.•A long-running project of research seeks to classify the major voting systems in terms of their computational resistance.•We show that fallback voting is resistant to each of the common types of control except two destructive control types.•We show that Bucklin voting performs almost as well as fallback voting in terms of control resistance.•We investigate the parameterized control complexity of Bucklin and fallback voting.
论文关键词：Computational social choice,Control complexity,Bucklin voting,Fallback voting,Parameterized complexity,Election systems
论文评审过程：Received 14 December 2012, Revised 30 April 2014, Accepted 5 September 2014, Available online 18 November 2014.
论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcss.2014.11.002
