The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem of social choice theory in an infinite society and LPO (limited principle of omniscience)

摘要

This paper is an attempt to examine the main theorems of social choice theory from the viewpoint of constructive mathematics. We examine the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem [A.F. Gibbard, Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result, Econometrica 41 (1973) 587–601; M.A. Satterthwaite, Strategyproofness and Arrow’s conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions, Journal of Economic Theory 10 (1975) 187–217] in a society with an infinite number of individuals (infinite society). We will show that the theorem that any coalitionally strategy-proof social choice function may have a dictator or has no dictator in an infinite society is equivalent to LPO (limited principle of omniscience). Therefore, it is non-constructive. A dictator of a social choice function is an individual such that if he strictly prefers an alternative (denoted by x) to another alternative (denoted by y), then the social choice function chooses an alternative other than y. Coalitional strategy-proofness is an extension of the ordinary strategy-proofness. It requires non-manipulability for coalitions of individuals as well as for a single individual.