Coevolution of discrete, mixed, and continuous strategy systems boosts in the spatial prisoner's dilemma and chicken games
作者：
Highlights：
• We established a new co-evolutionary model for strategy systems and strategy values, whereby agents adjust their decisions to apply discrete, mixed, or continuous strategy systems.
• Our simulation covered not only the prisoner's dilemma game but also the chicken dilemma game.
• A mixed strategy that presumes agents are consistent in their offers to all neighbors diffuses in most of the game regions with a reasonable level of social cooperation.
摘要
•We established a new co-evolutionary model for strategy systems and strategy values, whereby agents adjust their decisions to apply discrete, mixed, or continuous strategy systems.•Our simulation covered not only the prisoner's dilemma game but also the chicken dilemma game.•A mixed strategy that presumes agents are consistent in their offers to all neighbors diffuses in most of the game regions with a reasonable level of social cooperation.
论文关键词：Network reciprocity,Prisoner's dilemma,Chicken game,Evolutionary game
论文评审过程：Received 19 September 2016, Revised 25 December 2016, Accepted 9 January 2017, Available online 7 February 2017, Version of Record 7 February 2017.
论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2017.01.015
