Evolutionary investors’ power-based game on networks
作者：
Highlights：
• We propose an investors’ power-based game, where the payoffs of defectors depend on the efficiency of market and the related-power against cooperators.
• Economically, the efficiency of the market of investment is introduced in the game through a parameter α that becomes a key factor in the evolutionary process.
• Our simulation results show that, an improvement of efficiency benefits for the cooperation fundamentally.
• Furthermore, comparing with the result on BA scale-free networks, the evolution of cooperation performs great stability on WS small-world networks against the change of market efficiency.
摘要
•We propose an investors’ power-based game, where the payoffs of defectors depend on the efficiency of market and the related-power against cooperators.•Economically, the efficiency of the market of investment is introduced in the game through a parameter α that becomes a key factor in the evolutionary process.•Our simulation results show that, an improvement of efficiency benefits for the cooperation fundamentally.•Furthermore, comparing with the result on BA scale-free networks, the evolution of cooperation performs great stability on WS small-world networks against the change of market efficiency.
论文关键词：Investors’ power-based game,Cooperative behavior,Market efficiency,Evolutionary process
论文评审过程：Received 2 December 2017, Revised 12 February 2018, Accepted 21 February 2018, Available online 8 March 2018, Version of Record 8 March 2018.
论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2018.02.041
