Effects of strategy-updating cost on evolutionary spatial prisoner’s dilemma game

作者：

Highlights：

• We study the evolutionary spatial prisoner’s dilemma game with strategy updating cost.

• There exist sudden increases of cooperation level with the increase of temptation to defect.

• The critical threshold of strategy-updating cost has a nontrivial effect on the persistence of cooperation on networks.

摘要

•We study the evolutionary spatial prisoner’s dilemma game with strategy updating cost.•There exist sudden increases of cooperation level with the increase of temptation to defect.•The critical threshold of strategy-updating cost has a nontrivial effect on the persistence of cooperation on networks.

论文关键词：Social dilemma,Cooperation,Evolutionary games,Strategy-updating cost

论文评审过程：Received 3 August 2019, Revised 17 May 2020, Accepted 7 June 2020, Available online 22 June 2020, Version of Record 22 June 2020.

论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2020.125445