Investigating the co-evolution of node reputation and edge-strategy in prisoner's dilemma game
作者：
Highlights：
• a mechanism is proposed aiming to investigate the co-evolution of personal reputation and strategy under a general framework of interactive diversity.
• Numerous simulations are conducted with sufficient analyses of the obtained results being followed.
• The consideration of interaction diversity is able to ensure the maintenance of cooperation even if the temptation of adopting antisocial behavior (here, defection is considered) is relatively large.
• Various discussions are performed in order to explain the reason of this effect from various perspectives, for instance, by counting the number of various chains and the evolution of clusters.
摘要
•a mechanism is proposed aiming to investigate the co-evolution of personal reputation and strategy under a general framework of interactive diversity.•Numerous simulations are conducted with sufficient analyses of the obtained results being followed.•The consideration of interaction diversity is able to ensure the maintenance of cooperation even if the temptation of adopting antisocial behavior (here, defection is considered) is relatively large.•Various discussions are performed in order to explain the reason of this effect from various perspectives, for instance, by counting the number of various chains and the evolution of clusters.
论文关键词：Co-evolution,Node reputation,Edge-strategy,Evolutionary dynamics,Prisoner's dilemma game
论文评审过程：Received 9 January 2020, Revised 30 May 2020, Accepted 14 June 2020, Available online 26 June 2020, Version of Record 26 June 2020.
论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2020.125474
