Conditional cooperator enhances institutional punishment in public goods game
作者：
Highlights：
• We consider PGGs with cooperators, defectors, and conditional cooperators.
• Conditional cooperators cannot promote cooperation for the PGG with reward.
• Conditional cooperators can enhance the effectiveness of punishment.
• A high contribution level can be maintained even for small punishments.
摘要
•We consider PGGs with cooperators, defectors, and conditional cooperators.•Conditional cooperators cannot promote cooperation for the PGG with reward.•Conditional cooperators can enhance the effectiveness of punishment.•A high contribution level can be maintained even for small punishments.
论文关键词：Public goods game,Reward,Punishment,Conditional cooperation
论文评审过程：Received 23 June 2020, Revised 15 July 2020, Accepted 3 August 2020, Available online 25 August 2020, Version of Record 25 August 2020.
论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2020.125600
