Disbandment rule sways the evolution of tolerance
作者：
Highlights：
• We studied three-player iterated games in which players have an opt out option.
• Players can choose to hope to keep or break the current partnership.
• When partners include both cooperators and defectors, decision-making is difficult.
• We have found that the evolution of tolerance is affected by disbandment rules.
• Whether cooperation can evolve or not depends on disbandment rules.
摘要
•We studied three-player iterated games in which players have an opt out option.•Players can choose to hope to keep or break the current partnership.•When partners include both cooperators and defectors, decision-making is difficult.•We have found that the evolution of tolerance is affected by disbandment rules.•Whether cooperation can evolve or not depends on disbandment rules.
论文关键词：Cooperation,Evolutionary ecology,Evolutionary game theory,Exit option,Partner refusal,Prisoner's dilemma game
论文评审过程：Received 30 April 2020, Revised 28 July 2020, Accepted 13 September 2020, Available online 10 November 2020, Version of Record 10 November 2020.
论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2020.125678
