Environmental feedback and cooperation in climate change dilemma

作者：

Highlights：

• Climate change dilemma is formulated as a public goods game with environmental feedback.

• A dynamic model based on Particle Swarm Optimization algorithm is proposed with restricted exchange of information.

• Theoretical analysis and simulation results both show that environmental feedback promotes cooperation.

• Continuous contribution is more conducive to cooperation.

• Population composed of individuals that make decisions replying more on historical information than social information can promote cooperation.

摘要

•Climate change dilemma is formulated as a public goods game with environmental feedback.•A dynamic model based on Particle Swarm Optimization algorithm is proposed with restricted exchange of information.•Theoretical analysis and simulation results both show that environmental feedback promotes cooperation.•Continuous contribution is more conducive to cooperation.•Population composed of individuals that make decisions replying more on historical information than social information can promote cooperation.

论文关键词：Climate change dilemma,Public goods game,Environmental feedback,Cooperation

论文评审过程：Received 22 October 2020, Revised 23 December 2020, Accepted 3 January 2021, Available online 13 January 2021, Version of Record 13 January 2021.

论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2021.125963