Nash equilibrium and group strategy consensus of networked evolutionary game with coupled social groups
作者：
Highlights：
• We model a evolutionary game with coupled social groups as a networked game with two interdependent networks, and obtain the sufficient and necessary conditions to seek all pure strategy Nash equilibria, which can be calculated more connivently by matrix operations and MATLAB compared with previous methods.
• On the basis of the best response adjustment rule with the wisdom of crowd, an algorithm is established to structure the rigorous game evolutionary algebraic equation, which is very helpful for the subsequent analysis of the individual social behavior evolution.
• The group strategy consensus for the game is investigated carefully, and we derive some sufficient and necessary conditions on it.
摘要
•We model a evolutionary game with coupled social groups as a networked game with two interdependent networks, and obtain the sufficient and necessary conditions to seek all pure strategy Nash equilibria, which can be calculated more connivently by matrix operations and MATLAB compared with previous methods.•On the basis of the best response adjustment rule with the wisdom of crowd, an algorithm is established to structure the rigorous game evolutionary algebraic equation, which is very helpful for the subsequent analysis of the individual social behavior evolution.•The group strategy consensus for the game is investigated carefully, and we derive some sufficient and necessary conditions on it.
论文关键词：Nash equilibrium,Network game,Group strategy consensus,Semi-tensor product
论文评审过程：Received 11 January 2021, Revised 16 April 2021, Accepted 15 May 2021, Available online 4 June 2021, Version of Record 4 June 2021.
论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2021.126380
