The effect of stability-based strategy updating on cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas
作者：
Highlights：
• With the help of memory, we propose a stability-based strategy updating rule and study its effect on cooperative behaviors.
• Under this updating rule, the probability of learning strategy is affected not only by the difference of average payoffs but also the stability.
• Simulations show that compared with the Fermi rule, the introduction of stability enhances cooperative behaviors and average payoffs.
• Compared with the memory-based rule which considers the difference of average payoffs, the stability-based rule shows these superiorities on cooperators when the payoff parameters are relatively large.
摘要
•With the help of memory, we propose a stability-based strategy updating rule and study its effect on cooperative behaviors.•Under this updating rule, the probability of learning strategy is affected not only by the difference of average payoffs but also the stability.•Simulations show that compared with the Fermi rule, the introduction of stability enhances cooperative behaviors and average payoffs.•Compared with the memory-based rule which considers the difference of average payoffs, the stability-based rule shows these superiorities on cooperators when the payoff parameters are relatively large.
论文关键词：Memory mechanism,Fluctuation of payoffs,Stability-based updating rule,Application scope
论文评审过程：Received 7 June 2021, Revised 11 August 2021, Accepted 13 August 2021, Available online 30 August 2021, Version of Record 30 August 2021.
论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2021.126603
