Effects of interconnections among corruption, institutional punishment, and economic factors on the evolution of cooperation

作者：

Highlights：

• We construct a game-theoretical model by combing BG with IPGG to study the evolution of cooperation.

• We reveal that corruption will decrease the level of cooperation when cooperators are more inclined to bribe.

• We demonstrate that stronger leader and richer economic potential are both important to enhance cooperation.

• When defectors are more willing to offer bribes, stronger leaders in poor economic potential environment increase the advantage of cooperation.

摘要

•We construct a game-theoretical model by combing BG with IPGG to study the evolution of cooperation.•We reveal that corruption will decrease the level of cooperation when cooperators are more inclined to bribe.•We demonstrate that stronger leader and richer economic potential are both important to enhance cooperation.•When defectors are more willing to offer bribes, stronger leaders in poor economic potential environment increase the advantage of cooperation.

论文关键词：Cooperation,Evolutionary game theory,Institutional punishment,Corruption

论文评审过程：Received 3 January 2022, Revised 22 February 2022, Accepted 24 February 2022, Available online 16 March 2022, Version of Record 16 March 2022.

论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2022.127069