On the dynamics of Cournot duopoly game with private firms: Investigations and analysis
作者：
Highlights：
• A game is proposed for two competing firms seeking the maximizing weighted objectives that are profits and social welfare.
• The bounded rationality is adopted to construct the game’s evolution.
• The stability conditions for game’s Nash point are discussed.
• The Nash equilibrium point can be unstable through flip bifurcation.
• The game’s map is noninvertible and belongs to Z3|Z1 type.
摘要
•A game is proposed for two competing firms seeking the maximizing weighted objectives that are profits and social welfare.•The bounded rationality is adopted to construct the game’s evolution.•The stability conditions for game’s Nash point are discussed.•The Nash equilibrium point can be unstable through flip bifurcation.•The game’s map is noninvertible and belongs to Z3|Z1 type.
论文关键词：Cournot duopoly game,Bounded rationality,Stability,Bifurcation,Lobes
论文评审过程：Received 22 September 2021, Revised 19 June 2022, Accepted 22 June 2022, Available online 3 July 2022, Version of Record 3 July 2022.
论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2022.127354
