Preference evolution with deceptive interactions and heterogeneous trust in bounded confidence model: A simulation analysis

摘要

The bounded confidence model is a popular tool to model the evolution of preferences and knowledge in opinion dynamics. In the bounded confidence model, it is assumed that all agents are honest to express their preferences and knowledge. However, in real-life opinion dynamics, agents often hide their true preferences, and express different preferences to different people. In this paper, we propose the evolution of preferences with deceptive interactions and heterogeneous trust in bounded confidence model, in which some agents will express three types of preferences: true preferences, communicated preferences and public preferences. In the proposed model, the communication regimes of the agents are established. Based on the established communication regimes, the true preferences, communicated preferences and public preferences of the agents are updated. Furthermore, we use an agent-based simulation to unfold the influences of the deceptive interactions and heterogeneous trust on the evolutions of preferences.