Multi-stage sequential uniform price auction mechanism for divisible goods
作者：
Highlights：
• We present a multi-stage sequential auction mechanism of divisible goods under uniform price.
• We explore the formation process and composition of equilibrium points in each stage auction.
• Our mechanism can effectively reduce many underpricing equilibrium.
• Our mechanism can yield higher expected income than a single stage mechanism for the auctioneer.
• Our auction mechanism can avoid the occurrence of failure auction.
摘要
•We present a multi-stage sequential auction mechanism of divisible goods under uniform price.•We explore the formation process and composition of equilibrium points in each stage auction.•Our mechanism can effectively reduce many underpricing equilibrium.•Our mechanism can yield higher expected income than a single stage mechanism for the auctioneer.•Our auction mechanism can avoid the occurrence of failure auction.
论文关键词：Continuous homogeneous divisible goods,Multi-stage sequential uniform price auction,Not allowed to modify downward rule,Equilibrium points
论文评审过程：Available online 16 May 2013.
论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2013.05.030
