Stackelberg security games: Computing the shortest-path equilibrium
作者：
Highlights：
• A real security game is represented as a shortest-path game using a Lyapunov theory.
• The problem of finding pure and mixed strategies became computationally tractable.
• We introduce a joint c-variable to reformulate the problem as linear programming.
• We provide a method for constructing a Lyapunov-like function.
• We prove that the convergence of the method to a strong equilibrium is exponential.
摘要
•A real security game is represented as a shortest-path game using a Lyapunov theory.•The problem of finding pure and mixed strategies became computationally tractable.•We introduce a joint c-variable to reformulate the problem as linear programming.•We provide a method for constructing a Lyapunov-like function.•We prove that the convergence of the method to a strong equilibrium is exponential.
论文关键词：Security games,Strong Stackelberg equilibrium,Shortest-path games,Lyapunov equilibrium,Lyapunov games,Complexity analysis,Repeated Markov games
论文评审过程：Available online 16 January 2015.
论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2014.12.034
