Pricing, collection, and effort decisions with coordination contracts in a fuzzy, three-level closed-loop supply chain

作者：

Highlights：

• We study optimal decisions in a fuzzy three-level closed-loop supply chain.

• Pricing, collecting and effort decisions under six game models are examined.

• Performance of CLSC over various decision structures is evaluated.

• We design a practical and new contract to coordinate the decentralized CLSC.

摘要

•We study optimal decisions in a fuzzy three-level closed-loop supply chain.•Pricing, collecting and effort decisions under six game models are examined.•Performance of CLSC over various decision structures is evaluated.•We design a practical and new contract to coordinate the decentralized CLSC.

论文关键词：Closed-loop supply chains,Collection effort,Sales effort,Game theory,Fuzzy theory,Coordination contract

论文评审过程：Received 13 October 2017, Revised 16 March 2018, Accepted 17 March 2018, Available online 19 March 2018, Version of Record 4 April 2018.

论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2018.03.029