On equilibrium performance assurance with costly monitoring
作者：
Highlights：
• Extend (Restricted) Experience Based Equilibrium to the principal-agent framework.
• Players’ strategies on the generated equilibria fit for casual observations.
• Principal's strategies vary for the information disadvantage and costly monitoring.
• Agent achieves a good balance between the short-term profit and long-term stability.
• Counterfactuals improve principal's monitoring efficiency and reduce relative costs.
摘要
•Extend (Restricted) Experience Based Equilibrium to the principal-agent framework.•Players’ strategies on the generated equilibria fit for casual observations.•Principal's strategies vary for the information disadvantage and costly monitoring.•Agent achieves a good balance between the short-term profit and long-term stability.•Counterfactuals improve principal's monitoring efficiency and reduce relative costs.
论文关键词：Game theory,Dynamic game,(Restricted) Experience Based Equilibrium,Moral hazard,Reinforcement learning
论文评审过程：Received 12 November 2017, Revised 18 May 2018, Accepted 21 May 2018, Available online 26 May 2018, Version of Record 18 June 2018.
论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2018.05.025
