Dynamic evolution model of pedestrian cooperation behavior based on coordination game
作者：
Highlights：
• A new evacuation model with the replication dynamics and game theory is established.
• Pedestrian evacuation time is independent of the maximum average payoff.
• Pedestrian evacuation time is positively correlated with the game scope.
• A higher proportion of initial cooperators make the system evolve toward cooperation.
• High panic level and high pedestrian density make the system evolve toward defection.
摘要
•A new evacuation model with the replication dynamics and game theory is established.•Pedestrian evacuation time is independent of the maximum average payoff.•Pedestrian evacuation time is positively correlated with the game scope.•A higher proportion of initial cooperators make the system evolve toward cooperation.•High panic level and high pedestrian density make the system evolve toward defection.
论文关键词：Evacuation process,Dynamic network,Coordination game,Evolution of cooperation,Replicator dynamics
论文评审过程：Received 15 June 2020, Revised 5 October 2020, Accepted 25 October 2020, Available online 26 October 2020, Version of Record 10 February 2021.
论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2020.114173
