Expert decision-making: A Markovian approach to studying the agency problem
作者：
Highlights：
• The paper is a contribution to expert decision-making.
• We study the agency problem in an organisation within a Markovian framework.
• Findings show the hurdle in managing the agent’s behaviour via incentives and monitoring.
• Practices of looking for aggressive agents to generate higher profits are questioned.
• Current research interests in measures of corporate governance are also questioned.
摘要
•The paper is a contribution to expert decision-making.•We study the agency problem in an organisation within a Markovian framework.•Findings show the hurdle in managing the agent’s behaviour via incentives and monitoring.•Practices of looking for aggressive agents to generate higher profits are questioned.•Current research interests in measures of corporate governance are also questioned.
论文关键词：Agency theory,Principal–agent,Markov,Incentive-control structure,Greed,Reputation,Expert decision-making
论文评审过程：Received 10 September 2020, Revised 13 June 2021, Accepted 14 June 2021, Available online 17 June 2021, Version of Record 15 July 2021.
论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2021.115451
