Engineering of markets and artifacts

摘要

In this paper, we continue the dialog started by Roth [The Economist as Engineer: Game theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics, Fisher Schultz lecture, Econometrica 70 (2002) (4) 1341–1378] between economics and engineering in the context of design of markets. We take the position that markets and engineered artifacts are the products of a social process of design formulation. Our perspective is that designing of markets and artifacts follow the same kind of problem formulation and solution testing process. Further, we show using two case studies that the design of engineered artifacts and markets are often interdependent. In light of their similarities, methodologies for modeling and testing using theoretical, analytical, computation and physical models in engineering can inform the development of methods for testing in the design of markets. We also illustrate an example of devising a test and results of its execution thorough the use of a simple computational model of an electric power market. We conclude by summarizing the similarities between the designing of markets and artifacts and call for a continued dialogue between engineers and economists.