Reducing complexity in winner determination for combinatorial ascending auctions

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摘要

This paper describes an algorithm to reduce the computational complexity of winner determination for combinatorial ascending auction where bidding agents can place a bid for a combination of items at an arbitrary timing via the Internet. At e-marketplaces, where many services can be dynamically searched and used, an auction is a key technology for realizing market-based negotiations among ‘software agents’. Although some algorithms for reducing complexity have been proposed, they are only suitable for one-shot auctions where bidders submit bids only once simultaneously. Thus, we reduce computational burdens by using the previous valuation of bids for doing the next valuation. We then verify the effectiveness through evaluation.

论文关键词:Combinatorial auctions,E-marketplace,Computational complexity

论文评审过程:Received 30 October 2002, Revised 20 February 2003, Accepted 28 February 2003, Available online 9 May 2003.

论文官网地址:https://doi.org/10.1016/S1567-4223(03)00013-9