An incentive mechanism designed for e-marketplaces with limited inventory
作者：
Highlights：
• The new challenges of promoting honesty in a special e-marketplace, i.e. the e-marketplace with limited inventory (EMLI), are presented.
• An incentive mechanism for the EMLI has been proposed, considering these new challenges.
• Theoretical analysis and experimental results have shown the efficacy of the proposed incentive mechanism.
• The whitewashing attack is well addressed and robustness against other various attacks is discussed.
• The proposed mechanism has been shown to be efficient in both e-marketplaces with unlimited and limited inventory.
摘要
•The new challenges of promoting honesty in a special e-marketplace, i.e. the e-marketplace with limited inventory (EMLI), are presented.•An incentive mechanism for the EMLI has been proposed, considering these new challenges.•Theoretical analysis and experimental results have shown the efficacy of the proposed incentive mechanism.•The whitewashing attack is well addressed and robustness against other various attacks is discussed.•The proposed mechanism has been shown to be efficient in both e-marketplaces with unlimited and limited inventory.
论文关键词：Incentive mechanism,Buyer and seller honesty,Electronic marketplaces,Limited inventory
论文评审过程：Received 25 February 2013, Revised 7 November 2013, Accepted 8 November 2013, Available online 21 November 2013.
论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.elerap.2013.11.002
