Online double auction mechanism for perishable goods
作者:
Highlights:
• We investigate mechanism design for a spot market of perishable goods.
• We explain that failures of trading in the perishable goods damage social utility.
• We develop an online double auction that prioritizes time-critical bids.
• Multiagent simulations show the auction realizes efficient and fair allocations.
摘要
•We investigate mechanism design for a spot market of perishable goods.•We explain that failures of trading in the perishable goods damage social utility.•We develop an online double auction that prioritizes time-critical bids.•Multiagent simulations show the auction realizes efficient and fair allocations.
论文关键词:Market design,Online double auction,Perishable goods,Multi-agent simulation
论文评审过程:Received 11 December 2013, Revised 17 June 2014, Accepted 18 June 2014, Available online 26 June 2014.
论文官网地址:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.elerap.2014.06.004