Social dilemma based on reputation and successive behavior

作者：

Highlights：

• Two new reputation forming mechanisms using successive behaviors are proposed to encourage successive cooperation.

• When encouraging continuous cooperation, the system is not sensitive to reputation's adjustment.

• An ideal society where everyone chooses to cooperate can be achieved without total abandonment of personal interests.

• Which mechanism is better under different parameters is shown by the heat-map.

摘要

•Two new reputation forming mechanisms using successive behaviors are proposed to encourage successive cooperation.•When encouraging continuous cooperation, the system is not sensitive to reputation's adjustment.•An ideal society where everyone chooses to cooperate can be achieved without total abandonment of personal interests.•Which mechanism is better under different parameters is shown by the heat-map.

论文关键词：Evolutionary game theory,Social dilemma,Reputation mechanism,Successive behavior,Indirect reciprocation

论文评审过程：Received 18 November 2019, Revised 28 March 2020, Accepted 3 May 2020, Available online 1 June 2020, Version of Record 1 June 2020.

论文官网地址：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2020.125358